Abstract: Insurance contracts are founded upon the doctrine of utmost good faith which, inter alia, requires the prospective insured to disclose material circumstances within its knowledge. This article examines the extent to which rumours in relation to, and false allegations of, dishonesty, criminality or misconduct by a business insured fall within the scope of its precontractual disclosure duties. If every false allegation must be disclosed, the insured may be placed in a situation where he must pay a higher premium or where he is refused insurance. Non-disclosure may entitle the insurer to avoid the contract. This article considers the current law and reform proposals in this area and argues that fairer outcomes in unfounded allegation scenarios could be achieved by adopting a proportional approach to materiality and by introducing a more flexible remedies regime.
can be shown that the rumours or allegations which were outstanding at the time of placement were in fact unfounded, it is arguable that the insurer has not been prejudiced by not being informed about such rumours and allegations at the time of placement. On the other hand, an insurer is entitled to a fair presentation of the risk which may extend to information that "raises doubts about the risk" such as rumours or allegations.
12 A prudent insurer is "likely to take the view there is no smoke without fire" 13 when confronted with a rumour or allegation of dishonesty or criminal conduct and may therefore make an underwriting decision not to accept the relevant risk or to charge a higher premium or to impose special terms in relation to the rumour or allegation.
As will become apparent below, in addressing these issues, different judges have come to different conclusions. Moreover, academic commentary has elicited possible solutions to protect the insured within and outside the confines of the existing law. It is also important to note that the whole area of pre-contractual disclosure has recently been subject to a law reform review conducted by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (together, the "Law Commission") which, to date, in relation to consumer insurance, has culminated in the enactment of the 2012 Act.
This article is concerned with the business insured's duty of pre-contractual disclosure in relation to unfounded allegations and any references to the term "insured" and "insurance"
should be understood as "business insured" and "business insurance" respectively unless stated otherwise. It does not consider the position of consumer insureds other than by way of comparison. In Part B, this article examines the applicable legal principles and the case law relating to the disclosure of unfounded allegations. In Part C, this article then critically assesses reform proposals aimed at limiting the application of the duty of disclosure in relation to unfounded allegations and the availability of the remedy of avoidance. It will be argued that grave injustice in many unfounded allegation cases could be avoided by adopting a proportional approach to materiality and by introducing a more flexible remedies regime.
This article does not consider the insured's pre-contractual duty not to make false representations as to matters of material fact, expectation or belief; 14 also beyond the scope of this article is the consideration of pre-contractual disclosure by agents of the insured. 
The Common Law and the Marine Insurance Act 1906
In Carter v Boehm, Lord Mansfield CJ set out the scope of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure:
"Insurance is a contract of speculation. The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only:
the underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any circumstances in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque, as if it did not exist … Good faith forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing to the contrary."
15
The pre-contractual duty of disclosure of the insured in contracts of marine insurance has been codified in section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA 1906) . This provision has been held declaratory of the common law as applicable to non-marine insurance contracts. 16 From the provisions in section 18 a number of principles relating to the duty of disclosure have been extrapolated. First, the duty of disclosure applies until the contract is concluded. Secondly, only "material circumstances" need to be disclosed. "Materiality" is a question of fact determined in accordance with the test set out in s.18(2), namely whether a (non-disclosed) circumstance would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. Thirdly, the insured is only required to disclose material circumstances which are known to him or which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known to him. 17 Fourthly, s.18(3) enumerates a number of circumstances which do not need to be disclosed in the absence of inquiry. 18 Fifthly, the insurer's remedy for a breach of the duty of disclosure by the insured is avoidance. Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to the provisions of s.18 of MIA 1906, the courts introduced a requirement of "inducement". In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co.
Ltd. v Pine Top
Insurance Co Ltd the House of Lords held that, in order to prove a breach of the duty of disclosure, it must be demonstrated that the actual insurer was induced to enter into the 15 Carter v Boehm (n 1), 1909 . 16 See (n 1). 17 If the insured is not 'in business', e.g. in the instance of a consumer insured, no deemed knowledge is attributed. See Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc [1998 ] QB 587 (CA). 18 These circumstances are a) circumstances which diminish the risk; b) any circumstances known or presumed to be known by the insurer; c) circumstances as to which disclosure has been waived by the insurer; and d) circumstances covered by warranty.
contract of insurance on the terms agreed by the non-disclosure of a material circumstance. 19 For the purposes of the subsequent discussion, it is necessary to explore the notions of materiality and inducement and the remedy of avoidance in more detail:
a) Materiality
According to section 18(2) the test of whether a (non-disclosed) circumstance is material is whether or not it would have influenced the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he would take the risk. This test is also referred to as the "prudent underwriter test". The influence on the judgment of the insurer need not be "decisive" in the sense that the disclosure of the circumstance would have caused the charge of an increased premium or the decline of the risk. The judgment of a prudent insurer is considered to have been "influenced" if disclosure of the circumstance would have "an effect on the thought processes of the insurer in weighing up the risk". 20 Materiality, being a question of fact, is assessed by the courts often with the assistance of expert evidence.
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Specific instances of material circumstances will depend on the type of insurance and tend to fall into two broad categories: (1) physical risk factors which increase the risk of loss of the insured subject-matter (i.e. a claim) and (2) so-called moral hazards which are matters that affect the integrity of the insured and thereby increase the likelihood of false claims being made under the policy.
b) Inducement
The actual insurer must prove that he was induced to enter into the contract of insurance on the terms agreed by the non-disclosure of a material circumstance. 23 Whilst the nondisclosure need not be the sole inducement, the non-disclosure must be an "effective cause"
to the particular insurer entering into the contract. 24 
c) Remedy of Avoidance
On a breach of the insured's duty of disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract of insurance. If the insurer elects to avoid, such avoidance is retroactive: the contract is avoided ab initio and all claims and premiums already paid must be returned. 26 The right of avoidance is the only remedy available to the insurer in the circumstances 27 and can be lost, for example by affirmation or the operation of estoppel.
Case Law Relating to Unfounded Allegations
The two leading authorities on disclosability of (unfounded) allegations are the Court of The facts of Brotherton were as follows: the defendant, a local fronting insurance company, had issued a banker's blanket bond insurance to a Colombian bank. The reinsurer sought to avoid the contract of reinsurance on the grounds of non-disclosure, claiming that at the time of the conclusion of the contract allegations of serious misconduct and fraud on the part of senior staff of the bank had been raised in media reports, which eventually led to disciplinary and criminal proceedings. The reinsurers alleged that the allegations were material because they increased the likelihood of a claim and because they were suggesting moral hazard.
They sought a declaration that they were entitled to avoid the contract. The insurer argued that the allegations made had been politically motivated and that nearly all proceedings had been concluded in favour of the bank's officials, although a few were still pending, at the time of the purported avoidance and, accordingly, the allegations had not been material. On an application by the reinsurers, the first instance judge held that the insurer could not adduce post-contract evidence which showed that the allegations were unfounded.
The main issues on appeal before the Court of Appeal were (1) the materiality of the allegations, and (2) whether the validity of the avoidance depended on the correctness of the allegations and whether there was actual misconduct justifying the allegations. Mance LJ noted that the "philosophical basis" for the duty of disclosure is that "a true and fair agreement for the transfer of risk on an appropriate basis depends on equality of information". 36 Similarly, Buxton LJ explained that, if no disclosure of unfounded allegations were to be made, the insurer would lose the opportunity to take an informed decision at the time of placement.
37
The Court of Appeal also confirmed that materiality is to be tested at the time of placing the risk by reference to the circumstances known to the insured at that date. The Court of Appeal rejected the insurer's argument that the reinsurers could be deprived of their right to avoid for material non-disclosure of allegations by the insurer demonstrating with hindsight at trial that the allegations were false. Mance LJ said that such a conclusion was neither supported by "principle nor sound policy" 40 , the point of policy being that it would be undesirable to allow an insured to litigate the issue of the truth or falsity of the allegation. 41 The Court of Appeal commented in unfavourable terms on the reasoning in
The Grecia Express 42 where Coleman J had held that it would be contrary to an insurer's obligation of utmost good faith to seek avoidance in the face of evidence that the undisclosed allegations were in fact unfounded and that it would be unconscionable for the court to permit the insurer to avoid. 43 By analogy to the law of recission in general contract law, Mance LJ considered the right to avoid to be a self-help remedy. Accordingly, the court had no role to play in permitting or refusing to permit its exercise. 44 He doubted that the exercise of the right to avoid by the (re)insurer was subject to a requirement of good faith but the Court of Appeal did not rule out expressly that an insurer could be denied the remedy of avoidance where the insurer was aware that the undisclosed allegations were unfounded at the time of the purported avoidance. 45 The trial judge, Morrison J, applying the guidelines given by the Court of Appeal, found that the media reports went far beyond idle rumours and amounted to material allegations that ought to have been disclosed.
46
The relevant facts of The North Star have been summarised above. 47 The Court of Appeal held that the allegations of fraud constituted a moral hazard and were material, even though they ultimately turned out to be untrue, as at the time of placing such allegations would have affected the mind of a prudent insurer. In The North Star it was argued by the insured that only allegations giving rise to moral hazard which were material to the actual 39 ibid, para 22. 40 ibid, paras 26 and 29. 41 ibid, para 31. 42 The Grecia Express (n 32). 43 Brotherton (n 28), para 23. 44 ibid, para 27. This conclusion has been criticised -see text to n 127. 45 The Grecia Express, paras 28 and 34. 46 unless, at the time of placing, there was very clear evidence that the allegation was unfounded the insurer was entitled to disclosure. 49 However, he conceded that "old allegations of dishonesty and allegations of not very serious dishonesty" may not be material. 50 He further conceded that non-payment of premium might not be material as it "seems to go to the owner's credit risk, and not to the risk insured". 51 Although, as noted above, Waller LJ rejected a general relevance qualification to the "prudent underwriter test", it is submitted that these concessions add to the test an implicit notion of proportionality. The Court of Appeal declined to comment on whether the right to avoid for non-disclosure might be constrained for being contrary to good faith where the insurer knows at the time of the purported avoidance that the undisclosed allegations were in fact unfounded.
There are two further cases which merit brief discussion. First, Drake Insurance Plc v Provident Insurance Plc 52 is a case which, although not directly on point factually, considers a number of issues which are relevant to unfounded allegation scenarios. In Drake the defendant insurer had purported to avoid a policy of motor insurance for non-disclosure of a speeding conviction. The first instance judge found as a fact that, if the speeding conviction had been disclosed at the time of placing, it would have also emerged that a separate "fault" accident on the insured's records should have been reclassified as "no fault". 53 On the insurer's point rating system used for the calculation of premium, the reclassification of that accident would have cancelled out the speeding conviction and would have resulted in a premium reduction. The Court of Appeal held that, because the two circumstances would have cancelled each other out, the insurer could not show that he would have charged a higher premium and, therefore, failed to discharge the burden of proof on inducement and was not entitled to avoid. allegations and any exculpatory materials. In practice, the Drake inducement test depends on hypothetical facts about how the insurer would have reacted to the "true position" and how the insured would have responded to the insurer's reaction, such as an increased quotation or special terms.
Rix LJ, giving the leading majority judgment, considered obiter and "with caution"
that materiality had to be assessed by reference to the true state of affairs underlying the risk "conclusively established" at the time of the contract, and not just on the basis of information actually provided to the insurer. 54 The significance of this statement in relation to unfounded allegations is that any exculpatory material available at the time of the contract may negate the materiality of an unfounded allegation. This is consistent with Mance LJ's comments in
Brotherton.
55 However, as Waller LJ pointed out in The North Star the decision in Drake may be of assistance to the insured in very few cases, namely where the pre-contract exculpatory facts, and their effect, can be ascertained, for example by reference to a point rating system as used by the insurer in Drake. 56 Thus, in Brotherton, the exculpatory matters relied upon (the fact that nearly all proceedings had been concluded in favour of the bank's officials) had occurred only after the contract of reinsurance had been concluded. It had not been argued that the allegations were unfounded at the time of the contract.
In Drake the Court of Appeal also re-examined the question whether the insurer's right to avoid is limited by the doctrine of good faith. Obiter, Rix and Clarke LLJ both tentatively expressed the view that, as a principle of fair dealing, the right of avoidance is fettered by the requirement to exercise it in good faith. 57 In that respect, Rix LJ opined that the doctrine of utmost good faith should be given wider effect by having regard to a concept of proportionality. 58 Accordingly, if it had been shown on the facts that the insurer had (blind eye) knowledge of the fact that the earlier accident was "no fault" at the time of avoidance, the exercise of the right to avoid would have been in bad faith.
Extending the majority's views to unfounded allegation cases, it seems arguable that an insurer who intends to avoid for non-disclosure of an allegation but, prior to the exercise of its right to avoid, learns that the allegation is unfounded, may be prevented from avoiding by the doctrine of good faith. This approach does not sit easily with the unfavourable comments made by Mance LJ in respect of a requirement to exercise the right to avoid in 54 Drake (n 52), paras 69-77. Pill LJ dissenting on this point -see para 163 . 55 See text to ns 38-39. 56 The North Star (n 11), para 17. 57 Drake (n 52), paras 87 and 91 (Rix LJ), para 144 (Clarke LJ). 58 ibid, para 89.
good faith or conscionably. 59 Davey has suggested that the dicta in Drake can be reconciled to Brotherton such that, to have a materiality-negating effect, the exculpatory materials had to be capable of proving the allegation to be false "beyond peradventure" at the time of the contract. 66 He concluded that the weight of the exculpatory materials and, consequently, the extent to which it could negate the materiality of unfounded allegation, would "depend on all the circumstances known to the insured" at the time of the contract. 67 In addition, Tugendhat J expressly referred to a notion of proportionality when assessing the materiality of allegations, "having regard to the nature of the risk and the moral hazard under consideration". 68 Therefore, allegations which are too old or insufficiently serious may not be material, regardless of exculpatory materials being available. 69 He also drew a distinction between allegations of dishonesty and allegations of criminality not involving dishonesty.
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Meisels is a High Court decision and as such not binding on the higher courts.
However, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal has already recognised implicitly a notion 
D. REFORM

The Case for Reform
In The North Star Waller LJ acknowledged that "there is something unjust" in the notion that an insurer may have grounds for avoidance on account of undisclosed allegations against the insured which are in fact unfounded. 73 First, the insured may not be aware that an allegation he knows to be untrue may be material and therefore disclosable. 74 Secondly, the obligation to disclose an unfounded allegation under the current law presents the insured with a difficult choice: he must either (1) disclose an unfounded allegation thereby risking being refused insurance cover or being charged a higher premium on account of such allegation, or (2) withhold such information from the insurer thereby risking that the insurer may subsequently seek avoidance of the contract of insurance thereby leaving the insured without cover for claims. Thirdly, there is also the paradox noted by Forbes J in Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance
Co Ltd that the rule requiring allegations to be disclosed applies only to unfounded allegations.
75 If the allegation were true then the insured would be required to disclose that he had committed the fraud (or crime) and the disclosure of the allegation added nothing.
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Fourthly, the disclosure to the insurer of allegations of criminal conduct, whether true or false, is not easily reconciled with the criminal law principle of the presumption of innocence. 77 Fifthly, it is perplexing that an insured would be excused from disclosing a spent conviction for fraud under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 but may be required to disclose an allegation of criminality before he is even tried. 78 Finally, it could be argued that, in particular in scenarios where a claim has been made under the policy, an insurer who seeks to avoid on the grounds of non-disclosure of an allegation he knows to be untrue acts opportunistically. As a matter of policy, such behaviour should be discouraged because it can be wasteful and exploitative.
Thus, there are a multitude of reasons why the duty to make disclosure of unfounded allegations might operate unjustly and, accordingly, there seems to be a prima facie case for reform. However, any changes to the current law must also take into account the insurer's 73 The North Star (n 11), para 4. 74 This is a general criticism of the duty of disclosure which has been raised and/or acknowledged by the courts, commentators and the Law Commission (ns 4-8). 75 Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd (n 32) 460. 76 ibid. Forbes J concluded that this is "a conclusion so devoid of merit that I do not consider that a responsible insurer would adopt it and nor do I". As has been shown in Part B of this article, 
Judicial Intervention
To change the law on the disclosure of unfounded allegations two mechanisms may, in principle, be available: judicial intervention and legislation. As regards judicial intervention, the courts' ability to develop the law on the duty of disclosure and the remedy of avoidance has been hampered by the codification of the law on non-disclosure in ss. In this section, a number of areas potentially suitable for judicial intervention will be considered: a relevance qualification to materiality, proportionality, judicial control of expert evidence, inducement and the remedy of avoidance.
a) Relevance
The court in The North Star considered the insured's argument that allegations of dishonesty unrelated to the risk were immaterial, but ultimately rejected this approach as being inconsistent with the "prudent underwriter test" in the Pan Atlantic sense. 87 There is some judicial and academic support for the proposition that the notion of "materiality", in addition to satisfying the "prudent underwriter test", also requires the circumstance to have an objective connection to the risk. 88 However, other judges have adhered to the "prudent underwriter test" as the exclusive test for materiality. 89 A "relevance qualification" may reign in the width of the duty of disclosure by excluding from its scope circumstances that are only of commercial or emotional relevance to the insurer but are unrelated to the risk. 90 However, it is submitted that it is a difficult concept to apply to incidents of moral hazard because the notion of moral hazard comprises matters which go beyond the risk of the insured subjectmatter being lost or damaged and extends to matters which merely increase the risk of a false being made by the insured) is adopted, a relevance qualification would be of little benefit to the insured where allegations of dishonesty have been raised, because such allegations would in most cases be seen as relevant to the risk of loss under the policy: an allegation of dishonesty points towards a potential propensity of the insured to act dishonestly, which increases the risk of a loss being sustained through the fraudulent design of the insured.
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Midwinter argues that an allegation which the insured knows to be untrue at the time of the placement is not material because by virtue of its known falsity it is a mere "loose rumour"
and thus neither relevant to the risk of the occurrence of an insured peril nor to the risk of moral hazard . 97 This is an attractive proposition but it is unsupported by the authorities, which suggest that (1) the insured's own knowledge of innocence must be verifiable by exculpatory materials 98 and (2) wrong convictions may be material.
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Adding to the complexities of assessing relevance, Waller LJ put forward for consideration a legal definition of moral hazard confined to facts related to the "risk of the insured destroying the insured subject-matter". 100 It is submitted that such a definition may be both too narrow and too wide: it might exclude from the scope of disclosable moral hazards matters such as insolvency and unspent criminal convictions and it might still include unproven allegations of dishonesty because of their relevance to the risk of the insured fraudulently procuring the loss.
It is submitted that adopting a relevance qualification, whether to materiality generally or as part of a moral hazard definition which only allows for a binary outcome (i.e. relevant or not relevant), may not provide a just and comprehensive solution to unfounded allegation case. A better approach may be to regard relevance as a factor in a proportionate assessment of materiality, as discussed below.
b) Proportionality and Control of Expert Evidence
It will be recalled that in Meisels, Tugendhat J introduced the notion of proportionality when assessing the materiality of allegations:
"There is room for proportionality, having regard to the nature of the risk and the moral hazard under consideration. There may be things which are too old, or In essence, proportionality requires that a number of factors, such as the seriousness, specificity, formality and likely veracity of an allegation and their relevance to the nature of the risk insured, are taken into account in determining the materiality of an allegation. The notion of proportionality is a step away from the idea of "equality of information" 102 as it rules out from the scope of materiality allegations that are too remote to constitute moral hazard. Although proportionality was not explicitly referred to in Brotherton and The North Star, the categories of allegations considered to be immaterial or unlikely to be material by the Court of Appeal in both cases can be explained on the basis of proportionality: loose rumours lack specificity and by definition lack certainty as to the facts; old allegations would tend to lack in formality and veracity (as otherwise they would have been substantiated or repeated); trivial allegations lack seriousness; allegations not involving dishonesty could lack relevance; and allegations in relation to which the insured can provide exculpatory materials are likely to lack in veracity. In contrast, if criminal charges for a dishonesty offence have been laid against the insured by the relevant authorities on the basis of some evidence which has not been disproved by exculpatory materials at the time of the contract, it is arguable that the charge is material and should be disclosed. A proportionate approach is also supported by the authors of 'Good Faith and Insurance Contracts' who argue that the "seriousness and formality of the charge will assist in determining its materiality".
103
How should "proportionality" be considered forensically? Tugendhat J held that the notion of proportionality can be accommodated in the "prudent underwriter test" and that it was for the courts to decide the characteristics to be imputed on the hypothetical prudent underwriter. 104 It is already accepted that the hypothetical prudent underwriter is rational, intelligent and reasonable 105 and these characteristics could be expanded to the effect that a prudent underwriter takes a proportionate approach as to the information that he allows to influence his underwriting judgment.
One objection that might be raised against a proportionality assessment is that, in any given allegation case, such an approach may not be supported by expert evidence of current underwriting practice. underwriting practices are not "the embodiment of the 'prudent insurer'". 106 It will also be recalled that in Brotherton Mance LJ said that the courts are "the ultimate decision-makers" on materiality issues and that they will be able to take a "realistic and even a robust view" on the materiality of allegations. 107 Moreover, Davey 108 and Gay 109 identified the court's control over expert evidence in unfounded allegation cases as a key area for judicial intervention.
Whilst it is conceded, as Waller LJ pointed out in The North Star, that judges will generally be reluctant to reject underwriter expert evidence 110 , such evidence is not conclusive 111 and courts are entitled to reach their own conclusions without the benefit of expert evidence on materiality. 112 Once proportionality is accepted as part of a prudent underwriter's decisionmaking process in allegation cases, courts may be less reluctant to test more rigorously or override evidence that seeks to present the prudent underwriter as acting disproportionately in reaching an underwriting decision. In this respect, it should be noted that there have already been a number of cases in which expert evidence on materiality was rejected by the courts for being "extreme", "arbitrary" or "unrealistic". 113 Another argument that could be raised against proportionality is that the notion introduces uncertainty as to which factors are to be taken into account and the weight they should be given. As Rix LJ noted in Drake, traditionally, proportionality has played a negligible part in English commercial law because it prefers "stricter and simpler tests for certainty". 114 Several points may be made in response: first, Rix LJ in Drake went on to acknowledge that it may be necessary to recognize a concept of proportionality "to give wider effect to the doctrine of good faith". Rules. 119 Thirdly, every legal rule has to strike a balance between certainty of outcome on the one hand and flexibility and equity on the other. It is submitted that the current law on the duty of disclosure delivers neither on certainty, nor on equity: this article has noted the severity of the duty of disclosure and has shown how this might lead to injustice in unfounded allegation scenarios. At the same time, statistics 120 show a high volume of nondisclosure disputes, which is indicative of a lack of legal certainty, despite the seemingly simple test for materiality. Whilst proportionality may introduce a degree of uncertainty, the concept would be conducive to producing fairer results in allegation cases.
It is submitted that the principle of proportionality provides a rational basis for narrowing the range of material circumstances in allegation cases by reference to a number of factors indicative of the magnitude of moral hazard. In principle, proportionality could also operate to assess the materiality of other types of moral hazard or physical risks (using appropriate balancing factors) and, accordingly, could assist more generally in reshaping the width of the duty of disclosure.
c) Inducement
Davey suggests that the courts could narrow the test for inducement so that the remedy of avoidance will only be available if the insurer is genuinely prejudiced by the nondisclosure. 121 Although the Court of Appeal in Brotherton rejected the proposition that the test for the disclosure of unfounded allegations focuses on the need for actual prejudice 122 ,
Davey reasons that there is room for manoeuvre for making changes to the inducement test because the concept has not yet been exhaustively examined by the courts and inducement is not one of the elements of non-disclosure referred to in the MIA 1906. Davey's inducement test would operate with full hindsight, assessing whether the insurer would not have entered into the contract on the same terms if the full truth, including facts reducing the risk, had been known. By comparison, in Drake the court was only prepared to consider the likely reaction of the actual insurer if disclosure had been made and following discussions between the parties. It is submitted that, whilst Davey's inducement test is an attractive solution which could strike a fairer balance between the insurer and the insured, in order to establish noninducement, the insured would be allowed to litigate the veracity of the allegation on a purported avoidance. In Brotherton, Mance LJ stated, albeit in relation to the right to avoid, that litigating the veracity of an allegation would be undesirable as a matter of policy because it would force insurers to investigate the allegation's veracity and put them at risk of additional litigation and expenses. 123 Gay argues that it may be reasonable for the insurer only to plead the existence of the allegation and that it was not disclosed, and that it should then be for the insured to prove that the allegation was false. 124 It is submitted that the insurer would still be exposed to the trouble and expense of considering the evidence as to the veracity of the allegation as part of establishing its right to avoid and its trial preparations.
d) Avoidance
In The North Star, Waller LJ also put forward for reconsideration the idea that the insurer's right to avoid should not be absolute 125 . In Brotherton the Court of Appeal rejected this idea
(1) holding, by reference to the authorities on rescission in general contract law, that a court had no role to play in permitting or refusing the remedy of avoidance and (2) putting in considerable doubt that the insurer's exercise of the right to avoid is subject to a requirement of good faith. 126 As regards the first point, Clarke has criticised that there is an alternative line of authorities which supports the proposition that the courts have power to review the application of the self-help remedy of recission and that the courts have discretion under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 to refuse recission for misrepresentation. 127 If the courts would accept jurisdiction for the review of exercise of the remedy of avoidance, they could use their discretion to deny the remedy in cases where the insurer has acted unconscionably. However, it is submitted that this would introduce a level of uncertainty which would make it difficult for the insurer and the insured, as well as third parties such as reinsurers, to predict with some degree of confidence whether or not an election by the insurer to avoid will be confirmed or overturned by the courts. Moreover, if Mance LJ's analogy to the law on recission in general 123 Brotherton (n 28), paras 26, 29 and 31. 124 Gay (n 109) 5-6. 125 The North Star (n 11), para 20. 126 See text to ns 43-46. 127 Clarke (n 77) 558.
contract law is maintained, as Davey points out, proper consideration would need to be given to the potential impact on contract law generally.
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As regards the imposition of good faith limits to the remedy of avoidance, in contrast to Brotherton, the majority of the Court of Appeal in Drake expressed the obiter view that, as a principle of fair dealing, the right of avoidance is fettered by the requirement to exercise it in good faith. 129 In support of this type of good faith argument, Merkin has shown that a continuing duty of good faith of the insurer has been held to apply in other instances, such in settlement negotiations with third parties in the field of liability insurance. has no effective remedy for wrongful avoidance. 133 In light of these conceptual and practical difficulties with the imposition of good faith limits to the remedy of avoidance, it is submitted that a statutory reform introducing a compensatory remedies regime, as discussed below, might be a more promising option.
Legislative Change
Statutory legislative reforms can change the law more comprehensively but are difficult to achieve, as the proposals need to attract government support and the new law is required to In relation to the business insured's duty of disclosure, the Law Commission's final report and a draft bill are due in summer 2014. 139 In its Joint Consultation Paper on the business insured's duty of disclosure 140 it has put forward proposals for statutory amendments to the MIA 1906 aiming at a "'neutral' law that strikes a balance between the parties and which will impose reciprocal obligations on each". 141 With the possible exception of the compensatory remedies regime, the proposals are no radical departure from the current law and build upon existing judicial inroads into the orthodox position and principles of good industry practice. Of course, the Law Commission's proposals are intended to apply across the whole spectrum of non-disclosures and misrepresentations and are not limited to allegation scenarios. This article, however, will limit itself to a more detailed consideration of those proposals that are most relevant to allegation cases. 
a) Fair Presentation of the Risk
The Law Commission seeks to retain the duty of disclosure for business insureds as it is an established part of the way in which insurance business is done in the UK. 142 Unlike the largely homogenous consumer market, the business insurance sector covers a wide variety of risks which are less amenable to being captured by questions in a proposal form. Instead, the Law Commission is proposing to redefine the notion of 'material circumstance' as a circumstance required to provide a fair presentation of the risk. 143 This includes the following categories of information: (1) any information which is special or unusual or relating circumstances which increase the risk; (2) any particular concerns about the risk which led to the insurance being sought; and (3) standard information which market participants generally understand should be disclosed within a fair representation of risks of the type in question.
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As this is not an exhaustive list, other circumstances such as unfounded allegations may still be material to provide a fair presentation of the risk. In any event, allegations may fall into categories (1) or (3).
Although there is no express reference to relevance or proportionality, it is arguable that these concepts pervade the materiality test proposed by the Law Commission. Categories
(1) and (2) are examples of circumstances that are relevant to the risk. It is submitted that defining materiality not in terms of the prudent underwriter's reaction, but as circumstances required to provide a fair presentation of the risk, imports implicitly a degree of proportionality. Thus, a "fair" presentation of the risk does not require a "minute disclosure of every circumstance" but simply needs to "enable a prudent underwriter to form a proper judgment on the risk". 145 Moreover, the test focuses on the necessity ("required") of the disclosure to reach the desired outcome of a fair presentation. It is noteworthy that this is a move away from the notion of "equality of information" which Mance LJ held to be the basis of a true and fair agreement for the transfer of risk. 146 Under the revised test, unfounded allegations, loose rumours, trivial and old allegations, allegations that do not raise issues of dishonesty and allegations in relation to which exculpatory materials exist at the time of the contract are likely to be immaterial. If the insurer requires a presentation of the risk that is wider than "fair", under the Law Commission's proposals he will be expected to make further enquiries 147 or impose appropriate terms into the contract of insurance.
b) Insurer's Knowledge
The Law Commission further proposes to amend the MIA 1906 to clarify the scope of the insurer's knowledge, given that matters known or presumed to be known by the insurer need not be disclosed. They propose that the insurer's knowledge comprises information known by the directing mind and will of the insurer, the persons making the underwriting decision and information held by the insurer's agent or employees which ought to have been communicated to the person making the underwriting decision. 148 For example, in 
c) Remedies
The Law Commission shares the view that the remedy of avoidance can operate disproportionately as it tends to overcompensate insurers who, had full and accurate disclosure been made, would have simply charged a higher premium or imposed different terms. However, the Law Commission also acknowledges that the remedy of avoidance has a policing function in respect of fraudulent non-disclosure and misrepresentation. It has therefore recommended that the remedy of avoidance be retained where the insured has acted dishonestly. 151 However, where the insured's non-disclosure or misrepresentation has not been dishonest, the Law Commission proposes a compensatory system of remedies seeking to put the insurer into the position it would have been in had full and accurate information been provided: "(1) Where the insurer would have declined the risk altogether, the policy should be avoided, the claim refused and the premiums returned. A compensatory remedies regime may be helpful to an insured who non-fraudulently failed to disclose a material allegation. In many cases, a pre-contractual disclosure of a material allegation would have merely resulted in a higher premium or the imposition of terms in relation to the allegation. Whilst an increased premium might be unfair on an insured against whom an unfounded allegation has been raised, it is a comparatively small price to pay for continuing insurance coverage and the payment by the insurer of any valid claims. If the insurer would have imposed a term in relation to the relevant allegation, such a term may not even become operative in unfounded allegation scenarios. For example, where an allegation of fraud was made against a director of the insured, the insurer under a property and business interruption policy might have excluded from coverage any losses resulting from such fraud. If the allegation subsequently turns out to be unfounded, this exclusion will not become operative and therefore have no impact on coverage.
On the other hand, if the insurer asks the insured a specific question about allegations of dishonesty or criminal conduct but the insured, albeit aware of such an allegation, responds in the negative knowing the allegation to be unfounded, this may constitute a dishonest misrepresentation for which the remedy remains avoidance. However, it should be noted that the authorities are divided on whether an inquiry by the insurer has the effect of making 152 Law Com CP 204 (n 140) paras 9.39, 9.40]; draft Business Bill (n 142) s 7, Schedule, Part 1, ss 3-9. 153 Law Com CP 204 (n 140) para 9.82]. It should be noted that, under the draft Business Bill (n142) s 17 , contracting-out would be subject to the 'transparency provisions' applying to 'disadvantageous terms'. 154 2012 Act, s 4(1). 155 Law Com CP 204 (n 140), para 9.3. otherwise immaterial information material 156 . Moreover, the courts are likely to expect an insurer to ask clear and specific questions and may construe any ambiguities contra proferentem. Overall, it is submitted that the remedies regime proposed by the Law Commission, if implemented into legislation, would be a significant step in redressing the balance between insurer and insured as, in the instance of non-fraudulent non-disclosures, it aims to be genuinely compensatory for the loss the insurer has suffered, if any, as result of the non-disclosure. It is a default regime that neither over-compensates the insurer nor penalises the honest insured and, in that sense, it is neutral and proportionate. 157 Accordingly, the number of cases in which insurers opportunistically seek out and rely on non-disclosures at the claims stage to avoid a bargain that no longer suits them, should diminish. Arguably, if avoidance is no longer the only available remedy, there will be less pressure on the courts to intervene in circumstances where the insurer purports to exercise the remedy other than in good faith.
E. CONCLUSION
Over 40 years ago, Hasson 158 advocated a recalibration of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure into a much narrower duty as originally conceived by Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm. 159 In allegation cases involving business insureds the orthodox position is that the duty of disclosure remains a wide one: regardless of their actual veracity, allegations may be material and therefore disclosable to the insurer. As has been shown, this can cause injustice to the insured because he may be put in a position where he must choose between (1) disclosing an unfounded allegation and risking paying a higher premium or being denied insurance, or (2) withholding disclosure and risking avoidance of the policy by the insurer.
However, the more recent case law suggests that there is an emerging notion of proportionality in assessing the materiality of allegations. This article has argued that this is a welcome judicial inroad into the orthodox position which could be developed into a general principle of proportionality to provide a rational basis on which the range of circumstances material for pre-contractual disclosure can be narrowed down. It has been argued that a notion of proportionality can be accommodated in the "prudent underwriter test", which underpins the concept of materiality: the hypothetical prudent underwriter would take a proportionate approach as to the information that he allows to influence his judgment. This article has also advocated that the courts should take a more confident approach to expert evidence on materiality.
The Law Commission's reform proposals also seek to rebalance the duty of disclosure, inter alia by narrowing the definition of materiality and by introducing a more flexible remedies regime applicable to non-fraudulent non-disclosures and misrepresentations. This article has argued that the proposals for a compensatory remedies regime would allow for fairer and more proportionate relief, such as the payment of an additional premium or the imposition of additional terms in appropriate circumstances and would make it harder for insurers to use the remedy of avoidance opportunistically. If the Law Commission's proposals are implemented in combination with the development of the judicial notion of proportionality, it should be possible to attain a fairer balance between protecting the insured from oppressively harsh disclosure obligations and providing the insurer with a fair presentation of the risk in unfounded allegation cases and in the placement of business insurance more generally. Striking a fair balance will assist in keeping the UK insurance market internationally competitive and in upholding the reputation of English law as fair and commercial.
